This paper is an exploratory study of the implication of the inflation illusion hypothesis on institutional tilting. It joins the literature which looks at the rationality of institutional investment behavior. The paper relies on the premise of the Fisher effect -that correctly priced assets are good inflation hedges and that during times of high inflation, the prices of these assets will be bid up. If the market suffers from inflation illusion, then holders of these rationally-priced securities will liquidate their positions and tilt toward underpriced assets. I focus my study on the real estate investment trust (REIT) market. I find that institutions do in fact tilt their portfolios away from REITs that are good hedges in periods of high unexpected inflation holding constant other reasons that may influence institutional ownership (e.g. size, liquidity, momentum, etc.). Furthermore, these assets are less likely to be mispriced as institutional ownership decreases with the amount of mispricing in these securities.
Introduction
This paper evaluates portfolio tilting among institutions in the presence of inflation illusion and mispricing in the public REIT market. An implication of the Modigliani-Cohn's (1979) money illusion hypothesis is that if the stock market suffers from inflation illusion then stocks will generally be undervalued in times of high inflation. The inflation illusion hypothesis is a behavioral explanation of the failure of the Fisher Effect which states that assets' nominal returns should rise with inflation. Consequently, an asset that is a good hedge against inflation will be held by rational agents who correctly price these assets. Thus, in times of high inflation, the prices of these assets will increase and the rational agents holding these assets will tilt their portfolios toward undervalued assets. I test the above hypothesis in the REIT market. REITs (and real estate) are conventionally considered inflation hedges, we therefore expect the ownership of REITs to relate inversely with the time variation of inflation and mispricing in the market.
I find that institutions do in fact tilt their portfolios away from REITs in periods of high unexpected inflation, holding constant other reasons that may influence institutional ownership (e.g. size, liquidity, momentum, etc.). Furthermore, these assets are less likely to be mispriced because institutional ownership decreases with the amount of mispricing in these securities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relationship between the Fisher effect and the Modigliani-Cohn's hypothesis and section 3 describes the data and the empirical strategy used in this paper. I discuss my results in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
The Fisher Effect and the Inflation Illusion
The Fisher effect, a hypothesis posited by Irving Fisher (1930) , argues that nominal interest rates fully reflect available information concerning the expectations of inflation. Consequently, nominal returns on financial assets should increase with the rate of inflation, whereas real rates of return are independent of the inflation rate. Because the ownership of common stocks represents ownership of physical capital whose real value is assumed to be independent of inflation, common stocks should be an inflation hedge. The hypothesis spawned a large number of empirical studies on the effectiveness of assets as an inflation hedge. One of the earlier studies by Reily, Johnson and Smith (1970) defined an asset to be a complete inflation hedge if its real rate of return remains the same in high and low inflationary periods.
An asset is considered a partial hedge if its nominal return in inflationary times is greater than its nominal return in non-inflationary times. They conclude that stocks are, at best, partial hedges. Evidence against the Fisher effect was also found in Lintner (1975) , Fama and Schwert(1977) and Amihud (1996) . These studies invariably find a negative correlation between nominal stock returns and inflation. Fama (1981) argued that the negative correlation results from the "proxy effect". That is, inflation acts as a proxy for future economic growth: high inflation is associated with a depressed economy and thus nominal returns will tend to be lower when inflation is high.
Another interpretation of the observed negative correlation is put forward by Modigliani and Cohn (1979) . They hypothesize that stock market investors incorrectly discount real cash flows with nominal discount rates. This mispricing error is exacerbated in inflationary environments. As a result, when inflation is high low), stocks are undervalued (overvalued). The Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis has been empirically tested in more recent studies. For example, Ritter and Warr (2002) find that the value-price ratio is positively correlated with inflation and the effect increases with leverage. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) conclude that mispricing in the dividend-price ratio can be explained by inflation illusion. Inflation illusion seems to plague the real estate market as well. If homebuyers suffer from inflation illusion, a reduction in inflation could cause a housing bubble (Brunnermeier and Julliard, 2008) , as could large uncertainty about the level of inflation (Piazessi and Schneider, 2008) .
The finding that some assets are better inflation hedges than others (Fama and Schwert, 1977) suggests that good hedges are less likely to be mispriced and that the owners' assessments of these assets are not illusory.
This implies that in a market composed of both inflation-illusioned and rational investors, the prices of good hedges will be bid up during periods of relatively higher inflation. Rational investors who own these good hedges will then liquidate their positions and purchase assets that are underpriced by way of the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis. Since real estate has conventionally been considered a relatively good hedge against unexpected inflation, it is a natural sector in which to examine the above notion of portfolio tilting. Moreover, the availability of ownership data on real estate investment trusts makes it easier to distinguish "rational" investors from those more susceptible to inflation-illusion. Specifically, I use the effectiveness of real estate investment trusts (REITs) as an inflation hedge to identify "smart investors". I then examine the preferences of these investors and evaluate whether these preferences change with the level of unexpected inflation and inflation-induced mispricing.
Data and Empirical Methodology
The main database is created from institutional ownership data from Thomson 
The good and bad hedges
My main tests examine whether institutions tilt their portfolios toward mispriced assets during periods of high unexpected inflation within the REITs submarket. Each REIT is assessed based on (1) its inflation-hedging ability as well as (2) how mispriced it is relative to a theoretical construct. The estimation strategy is the following. First, I construct dynamic stock portfolios that are likely to show a consistent spread in their inflation-hedging ability. Specifically, I measure inflation-hedging ability using Fama-Schwert's (1977) regression model:
whereR i,t is the nominal return on REIT i at time t, E (I t | Ω t−1 ) is the expected inflation rate I given t−1 information Ω t−1 and
is the unanticipated inflation rate. An estimate of β 
Mispricing
Measuring the mispricing of REIT returns requires "correct" benchmark return. That is, mispricing is a relative concept and requires the establishment of a "true" or fundamental return. Computation of the mispricing measure will require the assumption that market values follow an asset pricing model. For simplicity, I assume that fundamental values follow the simple one-factor CAPM model. Robustness checks using other asset pricing models will be followed up in subsequent refinements of this paper.
For each REIT, I estimate the time-series of its mispricing by applying a Kalman filter to the residuals from the one-factor CAPM model. The estimated state variable is our measure of mispricing 1 .
Similar to the estimation of the inflation-gamma, the estimation of the mispricing is carried out using the same rolling window as was used in the estimation of the inflation-gammas. For each REIT, I estimate a timeseries of pricing errors which are used to rank individual REITs into quintile portfolios each quarter. The average level of mispricing within each inflation-gamma portfolio is shown in Table 1 . We see that weak inflation hedges tend to be underpriced while strong hedges are overpriced relative to the CAPM. This suggests that mispricing is related to a REIT's inflationhedging ability. Although there isn't a pattern in institutional ownership across the quintiles, portfolio returns increase with the inflation-hedging ability of REITs. This suggests that strong hedges have a larger mispricing component in their returns.
Empirical Results
A first look at portfolio tilting Table 2 reports the average temporal change in institutional ownership among REITs that are sorted sequentially by their inflation hedging ability and the level of mispricing.
Although the relationship is not monotonic, it appears that within a given mispricing group, institutions tend to favor strong hedges. This is To examine how the different levels of mispricing and inflation-hedging ability affect returns, Table 3 reports the equally-weighted portfolio returns of the quintiles. Portfolio returns increases with both inflation-hedging ability as well as mispricing. Evidently, the portfolio analysis is preliminary in the sense that it does not account for other stock characteristics that may affect institutional tilting. Moreover, averaging portfolio returns and ownership data this way may mask any temporal dynamics at the individual level. A closer look at these issues is provided in a regression framework in the next section. The regression analysis that follows attempts to control for these other 
where ∆IO i,t is the natural logarithm of the change in institutional ownership from period t − 1 to t and X i,t is a vector of the four characteristics for the ith REIT in quarter t: To test this idea, I regress mispricing on lagged unexpected inflation and the natural log of turnover -inflation illusion and liquidity preference being the two candidates that have been widely established to be responsible for priced risks that are not accounted for in a conventional asset pricing Table 5 . Similar to the results in Table 4 , liquidity does not seem to drive changes in institutional ownership. The estimated turnover coefficient is mostly negative and its effect is negligible. Firm Size has mixed results; it is associated with increased institutional ownership for the worst inflation hedges but is inversely related to institutional ownership for the best inflation hedges.
Across the portfolios, institutions prefer higher-priced REITs and appear to be momentum investors.
Lagged unexpected inflation increases institutional ownership only among the worse inflation hedges. Institutions decrease their holdings of the better hedges when there is an increase in unexpected inflation in the previous quarter. This confirms our hypothesis in the following sense. Because strong inflation hedges are rationally-priced assets in that they are not 2 Standard errors are in parenthesis and t-statistics are italicized. subjected to underpricing in times of high inflation, owners of these strong hedges are therefore rational investors who are not inflation-illusioned. In periods of high unexpected inflation, the demand for REITs that are strong hedges will rise. The prices of these strong hedges will be bid up, while securities owned by inflation-illusioned investors will be underpriced. Rational investors who own the good hedges should liquidate their positions in these assets and tilt toward the underpriced securities. The negative sign that we see on unexpected inflation supports the notion that rational institutions owning the good hedges decrease their holdings of these assets in order to purchase underpriced assets in their portfolios. The negative sign on the "Mispricing II" variable for the best inflation-hedge portfolio is consistent with the rational tilting hypothesis as well: rational institutions abandon overpriced good hedges. Nevertheless, it remains a puzzle as to why the mispricing variable remains a substantive determinant of increased institutional ownership for the other 4 portfolios.
Conclusion
This paper explores the implications of the inflation illusion hypothesis on institutional tilting. It joins the literature which looks at the rationality of institutional behavior. To that end, I use the inflation-gamma measure as a barometer to establish whether a REIT is a strong or a weak hedge against unexpected inflation. I then test whether institutions which own these strong hedges will tilt away from these securities in search of underpriced securities in periods of high inflation; that is when the stock market is believed to be prone to inflation illusion.
I find that institutions do in fact tilt their portfolios away from REITs that are strong hedges in periods of high unexpected inflation holding constant other reasons that may influence institutional ownership (e.g. size, liquidity, momentum, etc.). Furthermore, these assets are less likely to be mispriced as institutional ownership decreases with the amount of mispricing in these securities. It remains a puzzle as to why institutions continue to increase their holdings of overpriced REITs that have been shown to be less-than-ideal inflation hedges in inflationary times. To answer the question, one would need to first determine the economic substance that makes up this mispricing variable which is independent of any inflation-induced pricing error and is not related to individual liquidity.
